Stygius

NK nukes: Already stumbling?

The growing consensus is that yesterday's agreement with North Korea is stumbling out of the gate, and that the vagueness of the statement makes negotiations' eventual collapse inevitable. NYT here and here. This is a mistake, and those fostering this sense of inevitability are contributing to the mistake. This gives hardliners in both countries the lee-way to continue their efforts at scuttling a deal.

This is an on-going process, and for it to have come this far is its own kind of victory. There have been some concessions on principles, and now there is going to be a round of negotiations on implementation. As I wrote yesterday:

There's the rub: the sequence of implementation, which also gives the North Koreans the scent for additional concessions in the offing.

There's no sense folding, however, and arguing that talks are doomed. That would be foolish. An extremely difficult hurdle has been surmounted, but now another difficult hurdle needs to be surmounted. In retrospect, they will appear as mere bumps. If the Americans allow themselves to be exhausted by North Korean tactics, that would be failure. (Apologies for mixing metaphors.)

North Korea to give up programs

What a lovely morning. Congratulations to Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill on the provisional agreement with North Korea. We're seeing what a commitment to diplomacy can achieve. Also, congratulations to Secretary Condoleezza Rice. We're seeing what a Secretary of State with influence in an administration can achieve; the Vice President wasn't able to get John Bolton in to sabotage process while the President indulges in what I've called "tough guy poseur." See this previous post. (The White House hardliners are less concerned with solving the problem than with appearing non-Clinton in any agreement with North Korea; see this and this.)

Text of the agreement from the Associated Press.

New York Times:

North Korea agreed to end its nuclear weapons program this morning in return for security, economic and energy benefits, potentially easing tensions with the United States after a three-year standoff over the country's efforts to build atomic bombs.

The United States, North Korea and four other nations participating in nuclear negotiations in Beijing signed a draft accord in which Pyongyang promised to abandon efforts to produce nuclear weapons and re-admit international inspectors to its nuclear facilities. Foreign powers said they would provide aid, diplomatic assurances and security guarantees and consider North Korea's demands for a [light-water nuclear reactor].

The agreement is a preliminary one that would require future rounds of negotiations to flesh out, as it does not address a number of issues, like timing and implementation, that are likely to prove highly contentious. China announced that the six nations participating in the talks would reconvene in November to continue ironing out the details.

Keep in mind this is still a provisional agreement, that could erode if North Korea starts re-defining concepts or making new demands. That is their standard style, so long as they think they can gain additional concessions. (Unfortunately for them, while their nuke program gets everyone hot and bothered, it is so unpalatable that as a bargaining chip it is all-or-nothing; hence, there aren't many separate increments for them to give in to and then go back on.)

Progress in the North Korean talks could give the United States and European countries some diplomatic momentum in their negotiations with Iran over that country's nuclear weapons program, which is not considered as advanced as the North Korean one.

More generally, it would appear to increase support for people inside the Bush administration who favored pursuing laborious negotiations with the North Koreans. Hardliners in the administration and in Congress had raised questions about the usefulness of negotiations with the country, which they have argued has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons.

And they will point out that this remains a provisional agreement that the North Koreans may start thwarting in the future. The most nebulous point may also be the most important:

Most pointedly, the agreement finesses the North Korean demand that proved the biggest stumbling block in the latest round of talks -- its condition that the outside world provide a light-water nuclear reactor that it says it will use to produce electricity. The issue is left essentially unresolved, potentially leaving both sides to claim that their views prevailed.

The agreement states that the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea will discuss providing North Korea with a light-water reactor "at the appropriate time." Appropriate is not defined in the text, leaving open the possibility that North Korea will continue to insist on receiving that concession as a first step before it gives up its nuclear weapons.

A senior American official said all the other parties made clear to North Korea that "the appropriate time" would come only after North Korea rejoined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and re-admitted nuclear inspectors. He added that North Korea would not be able to achieve those goals until it dismantles its nuclear program.

There's the rub: the sequence of implementation, which also gives the North Koreans the scent for additional concessions in the offing. The LA Times:

The fourth round of talks followed what has become a familiar pattern in tortuous negotiations with North Korea, with a breakthrough coming just as it seemed the negotiators were about to throw up their hands and walk away. Earlier in the day, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. negotiator, described the talks as at an "endgame," and the parties as ready to go home.

The key sticking point had been what type of civilian nuclear program North Korea would be allowed to keep after dismantling its weapon-making facilities. The United States readily acceded to Pyongyang's demands to use a small research reactor to produce radioactive isotopes for medicine and agriculture, but vetoed the idea of a light-water reactor — a type less easily adapted to weapons production — for electricity.

The parties got around this hurdle by agreeing to "discuss at an appropriate time" the building of a light-water reactor for North Korea, according to the statement.

In a shorter piece, the Washington Post styles it a victory for host China, with no analysis of the factions within the White House.

North Korea's nuclear test

Jeffrey Lewis and Eric Umansky examine the hyped story from May of a potential North Korean nuclear test, which Stygius swallowed at the time. They focus on this New York Times piece, on the US intelligence community's internecine labor pains over the data.

In a classified briefing on April 26, at about the same time Washington was warning its allies, the Central Intelligence Agency told Congress that it was unlikely that North Korea would conduct a nuclear test anytime soon.

Also make sure to read Cheryl Rofer. I don't want to imply that I am minimizing or downplaying a North Korean threat; I merely want to point out these epistemological difficulties, given tendencies for the administration's internal debates to be fought with inflammatory flim flam leaks in the press in order to sabotage policy.

Let's hope they let him work

For two days now, the US and North Korea have been engaging in bilateral talks under the 6-party aegis. This is precisely what the US needs; a fairly closed environment and low expectations may lead to the kind of incremental breakthrough that will bring some stability to the peninsula. The South Koreans and Chinese are playing the enablers -- China by hosting a conference while pressuring North Korea, South Korea by throwing lifelines to the regime to erode its zero-sum rhetoric -- giving breathing space to the two most intractable parties. Japan is isolated, but maybe it's good to have someone be the ugly stepchild.

The opening statements are significant, because usually that is where the North Koreans outline positions so unreasonable that they paralyze talks. This doesn't seem to be happening in this case, leaving me wondering whether there has been a strategic sea-change inside the regime. Washington Post, New York Times, LA Times, Bloomberg, AP, Reuters, Telegraph, and Sydney Morning Herald.

Hopefully, the administration has given Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill the flexibility and space for him to do his work without being undermined and intrigued against in Washington. What a relief not having John Bolton around to screw it up! Can you imagine the kind of crap he would be pulling if he was in New York? For instance, the Sydney Morning Herald:

Talking to CNN television at the weekend, Mr Armitage said official minders had held the previous chief US negotiator at the talks, James Kelly, to a strictly uncompromising line towards the North Koreans. He likened this to the former Soviet Union's controls on its envoys. "The watchers were watching the watchers watching the principals," Mr Armitage said.

Mr Armitage was critical of the role played by the State Department's former arms control chief, John Bolton - now Mr Bush's controversial nominee as ambassador to the United Nations - in apparent efforts to derail previous talks. This took the form of highly critical speeches about North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-il.

After mounting criticism of the US' paralyzed policy, especially from within his own party, it looks like President Bush has given Secretary Rice a free hand in getting results. The administration's internal debate centered on a regime change policy versus a de-nuclearization policy. That debate led to paralysis. By acknowledging North Korea's sovereignty, the administration has opted for the latter, opening the way for a formal end to the Korean War.

Democracy Arsenal has a nice post on Christopher Hill, especially his place in the Bush Administration's tangled web. North Korea zone has more.

Update: Also, a nice post by Cheryl Rofer. She's growing incredulous as to whether Pyonyang even has a functional nuke (although all agree they have plutonium).

Plotting North Korean insecurity

The Washington Post has a good one on the resurrection of diplomacy on North Korean nukes. Kim Jong-Il's statement about his father, Kim Il-Sung's "dying wish" to have a non-nuclear peninsular is surely bullshit, but it goes to illuminate the regime's internal politics. Kim is creating space for maneuverability by fusing nuclear negotiations with the state religious doctrine of Kim Il-Sung infallibility.

Anyway, a few paragraphs down, we have this:

The Bush administration never liked the 1994 deal, and some officials privately admit they had plotted its demise even before the uranium enrichment program was discovered. In the words of one advocate of confrontation, it was a "catastrophic success" when North Korea unexpectedly acknowledged the program, allowing the United States to scuttle the agreement.

Keep in mind that this was factional plotting, not an administration policy per se. North Korea policy became so paralyzed during the first term because of this internecine warfare. For some no policy is preferable to advancement. And the State-DOD conflict is ongoing:

In Bush's second term, tensions have continued to emerge. In June, a senior Defense official traveling with Rumsfeld earned Rice's ire when he told reporters -- on condition of anonymity -- that the administration might soon take the North Korean issue to the U.N. Security Council.

That insiders are actually employing the "catastrophic success" phrase approvingly makes one's skin crawl. Ivo Daadler writes:

It now appears that "catastrophic success" has become the Bush administration's favorite catch-phrase for describing every misstep in its foreign policy . . . .

And:

So there you have it: a decision that allowed North Korea to unfreeze its plutonium production program, kick out weapons inspectors, and within months produce enough plutonium for 6 to 8 more nuclear weapons is heralded by the Bush people as a success.  By that standard, I'd like to know how they would define failure -- catastrophic or otherwise.

Fred Kaplan on Korea moves

Fred Kaplan has a nice overview of the recent diplomatic shifts on North Korean nuclear negotiations, and where they can go from here. Also see China Hand's take.

Biden & Lugar: Get it together on North Korea

Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Dick Lugar and ranking Democrat Joe Biden ganged up on the Bush Administration's Keystone Kops North Korea policy. NYT:

Two senior senators, a Republican and a Democrat, pointedly criticized American policy on North Korea today, saying that it was inconsistent, ineffective and undercut efforts to revive stalled talks with Pyongyang by giving the impression that its real aim was regime change.

I say again, the problem is that so often when it comes to foreign policy, the president lets administration factions fight it out, and then goes with the winner. It's a horrible way to construct a policy, and it embarrasses the country.

"Although I understand that there may be a need for some ambiguity in United States policy toward North Korea," [Mr. Lugar] said, "it is not evident this ambiguity has been constructive or even intentional."

There were divisions, he said, both on the questions of changing the Pyongyang government and of offering it economic incentives. There were also differences, another senior Republican, Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, said, about whether to seek sanctions through the United Nations.

"If our policy is to be effective," Mr. Lugar said, "our ultimate course must be internal consistency." [My emph.]

In other words, at least come up with a policy. That's always a start.

NK nukes, China & Japan

I just put the North Korea zone blog into my roll.

Also, check out this China Hand post. He sees North Korea's nuclear diplomacy as having more to do with Beijing's fears of a nuclear Japan than anything else:

There is, I believe, a more subtle dynamic than raving madness at work behind the otherwise mystifying behavior of North Korea.

Kim Jung Il is deliberately fomenting the nuclear crisis in order to extort Chinese aid and support.

According to this scenario, when he gets what he’s looking for, he’ll back down and remove the easiest pretext at hand for Japan to go nuclear.

And China can breathe a little easier.

It's long, but well written. A plausible thesis, especially since we Americans explain foreign policy problems self-centeredly.

North Korea and DOD

The recent diplomatic motion on the Korean peninsula has been accompanied by some deployment signalling to Pyonyang from the Pentagon. Is the Administration finally coming up with a policy on North Korea, with State and DOD on the same page at that?

The Agonist has an analysis. I agree with Sean-Paul that this isn't about pre-deployment (anti-Bush folks looking for Iraq parallels will end up punching at shadows); instead these maneuvers are more like semantic expressions. praktike recently pointed to Brent Scowcroft's comments weighing in. Personally, I'm not afraid of a little brinksmanship and unpredictability on the part of the United States at this point, I just don't think that Big Mouthing at press conferences can be the one and only diplomatic strategy our country has at its disposal.

Increasing carrier presence in Pacific

EagleSpeak reports the Navy is thinking about forward-deploying another carrier in the Pacific; to either Hawaii or Guam. This would allow the US to much more quickly have at least two carriers on-scene in Asia trouble spots.

Check it the post, he has an interesting update on US acquisition of Sunburns.