Michael Roston on the GAO's overview of the non-strategy.
At a specifical (sic) level, GAO first found that the Bush plan "assumed that
Iraq would have a permissive security environment" which never
materialized. The danger form the insurgency in particular "threatens
to undermine the development of effective Iraqi governmental
institutions."
Specifically:
The agency also sees that the US "assumed that the Iraqis and the
international community would help finance Iraq’s developmental needs."
But, "these expectations have not yet been met, and Iraq’s estimated
future reconstruction needs vastly exceed what has been offered to
date."
GAO also found shortcomings in American plans to pay for and
implement reconstruction activities. Particularly, they found that
"neither DOD nor Congress can reliably determine the cost of the war,
nor do they have details on how the appropriated funds are being spent
or historical data useful in considering future funding needs," and
that "little guidance is provided to assist implementing agencies in
resolving conflicts among themselves, as well as with other entities.
In our prior work, we found that delays in reconstruction efforts
sometimes resulted from lack of agreement among U.S. agencies,
contractors, and Iraqi authorities about the scope and schedule for the
work to be performed."
More at Roston's blog.
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