Following up: Bradford Plumer explains terrorism

Last week I wrote this critique of Bradford Plumer's Mother Jones piece, "From Beslan to Bethlehem". In reply to criticism (including mine), Plumer posted this on his personal blog; an "elaboration and defense," he says.

But the piece ... makes a number of pretty basic blunders, so it's hard to just walk away from this one. For the record, my excuses for the shoody (sic) piece are: a) I'm a terrible writer, b) it's a complicated topic, and c) the constraints of the "Daily Mojo" format meant I had to type the thing up in a few short hours, without any edits.

And then:

The important thing is to split the difference between figuring out root causes (including historical causes) of terrorism and taking note of the fact that there really are serious terrorists who can't be reasoned with. And yes, I certainly think, as Masha Gessen pointed out, that al Qaeda and other Salafi militant groups have appropriated the Chechnya conflict for their own purposes. Many of these groups moved into the failed state that arose when Russia withdrew from Chechnya in 1996. Russia is, of course, to blame for the general state of affairs, but as this Stygius fellow says you have to identify "the terrorist as a moral agent" too.

Gessen's piece isn't altogether bad, but this particular argument is questionable:

So, what does al-Qaida and international Islamic terrorism have to do with any of this? Probably very little. Chechens have plenty of reason to do what they do without outside inspiration. In addition, their tactics are very different from al-Qaida's. Osama Bin Laden's group generally aims for maximum casualties; the Chechens, at least when they have staged hostage-takings, have not seemed to have that goal. Al-Qaida explicitly targets Westerners; the Chechens, on the other hand, explicitly exclude Westerners from their list of targets; they target Russians and Russia-sympathizers. Finally, the Chechens' demands, when they have made them, have always focused on the war in Chechnya to the exclusion of any religious or international agenda.

First of all, arguing that since the Chechens don't need outside inspiration to practice terrorism, al-Qaeda and international islamist terrorism "probably" doesn't play a role in Chechnya is strange; it simply doesn't follow. Afghanistan had plenty of reason to wage an insurgency against the Soviets, yet that didn't mean the conflict wasn't attractive to Arab militants. In fact, it provided the crucible for transnational islamofascism to thrive. The similarities with Chechnya are undeniable, and to argue it wouldn't be equally attractive to transnational movements and their financiers is disingenuous. Secondly, the leadup to the Beslan massacre (the Moscow subway bombing, the simultaneous bombing of the Russian jets) is actually an al-Qaeda signature. Also , to think that al-Qaeda wouldn't involve itself in and support such an immediate and visible atrocity like Beslan would require denying their attraction to high-profile violence.

Thirdly, Gessen's claim that al-Qaeda specifically targets Westerners is simply fatuous; the attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia put the lie to this. Also, the idea that al-Qaeda distinguishes Russia from the West in general is foolhardy, especially since the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan serves as the paradigm of jihadism. Fourthly, Urban Empire shows that the Chechen agenda doesn't necessarily exclude threats against America and plenty of religious prattling.

None of these counter-arguments prove that al-Qaeda was involved in the Beslan attack, or plays a role in the broader Chechen war (those are different arguments; also see this 2003 article), nor am I claiming that al-Qaeda or some other group runs the show in Chechnya, but I'm trying to show that Masha Gessen's denials of an al-Qaeda presence are unconvincing. In the end, al-Qaeda is only representative of a broader transnational Islamist militancy that she does acknowledge has played a role in Chechnya. To think that safety will come through solely focusing on "al-Qaeda" as we know it misunderstands the nature of the organization and its movement. To think that these movements only relate to x-conflict if it shares their international goals is foolish; support of localized movements can serve this agenda very well (witness Jemma Islamiya in Indonesia and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines).

But back to Bradford Plumer:

but I just want to make my main point, which should have been in the original article and which I made later on: "The point of trying to resolve these situations is to separate out those who, like al Qaeda, will attack the West no matter what, and those who will join bin Laden's jihad because of specific grievances." Yes, I really do believe that if the U.S. helped fixed Chechnya and Palestine and Kashmir (no, of course it's not easy), even on not-so-amenable terms, a lot of people would go home and tune bin Laden (or Shamil Basayev) out. Then the West could focus its attention solely on those who still insist on fighting, even after the grievances are solved—the radical wing of Hamas, say, or Besayev's Wahhabi fighters in Chechnya. I'm not trying to plump for "historicist" explanations of terrorism, simply stating what I think is a pretty basic fact: When there are historical grievances afoot (as in Chechnya), then it's hard to distinguish between "pure terrorists" and "issue terrorists," because their interests meld pretty seamlessly. (my underline)

It's interesting that Plumer misquotes himself; in the original statement he writes, "...because of legitimate grievances," which later becomes "...because of specific grievances" here (my bold). Why?

But I do agree that resolutions to Kashmir, the Middle East and Chechnya (and elsewhere) will go far in removing the sources from which islamofascism derives its legitimacy. Also, resolving these crises are worthy in their own right as well. Terrorist movements deriving legitimacy from conflict, however, is a far cry from terrorist movements being caused by conflict. I think Plumer is starting to see this distinction, but I still have to ask that even though he seems to deny that "pure terrorists" have legitimate grievances, can "issue terrorists" practice a justified terrorism? Are we meant to understand terrorism targeting civilians, and deliberately targeting children, as being explicable due to context? And does explicability confer legitimacy?

Lastly, Plumer believes--perhaps rightly--that resolution of this second Chechen war will deny Basayev, et al, the pretext for terrorism. Now I ask, isn't it therefore in their interest to perpetuate the conflict, unless it ends on their terms? The localized legitimacy of their cause would never diminish if it was explicable and legitimate. And are their terms such that we ought to accept them? Answering these questions are necessary if we ever want to have real peace in Chechnya, beyond just wishing for it.

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[Dale Lockwood]

Dale Lockwood http://dale2009.com